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1. INTRODUCTION
PRC Speas, assisted by David R. Bornemann Associates, Inc., has conducted
I
analyses of flight plan data for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration-Lewis Research Center under Contract #NAS3-22748.
The objective of these analyses was t1% assess the potential improvement
in fuel savings which may oe possible from improved meteorological
data. Flight plans calculated from prescribed input parameters and
meteorological data sets were used as quantitative indicators of differ-
ences in fuel burn and other relevant parameters. Flight plan data were
provided through the cooperation of two airlines which will be referred
to as "BLUE Airlines" and "RED Airlines" throughout this report in order
to maintain anonymity.
The work program under this contract was divided into four tasks, each of
which involved various comparisons of flight plans, flight tracking, or
wind and temperature data developed from weather forecasts or actual
analyses under different sets of conditions. The final report consists	 g
:r
of four volumes, each presenting the findings for one of the tasks, and 	
M
this volume which summarizes the entire study and its findings.
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2. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
2.1 OVERVIEW
The results of this study have shown that the potential fuel savings from
using more timely and accurate weather data in flight planning and route
selection are conservatively estimated to be between 1.2 and 2.5 percent.
This occurs when comparing a flight plan based on the operational
Suitland forecast and on a route compatible with the North Atlantic
tracks with one based an the actual weather (verifying analysis) using
the minimum fuel track routing. Further results from actual flights show
that savings may be greater.
In order to verify the accuracy of the Suitland forecast, flight plans
developed on it were compared with actual data observed by the aircraft
(and averaged over 10 degree segments). 	 The results showed that the
average difference between the forecast and observed wind speed was 9
kts. without considering direction, and the average difference in the
component of the forecast wind parallel to the direction of the observed
wind was 13 kts. - both indicating that the Suitland forecast under-
estimates the wind speeds. The Root Mean Square (RMS) vector error was
30.1 kts.	 The average absolute difference in direction between the
forecast and observed wind was 26 degrees and the temperature difference
was 3°C. These results indicate that the forecast model as well as the
verifying analysis used to develop comparison flight plans was a limiting
2.
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factor and that the average potential fuel savings or penalty are up to
3.6 percent depending on the direction of flight. These potential
savings are entirely attributable to improved forecast accuracy since the
routes were the same.
Data are also developed which show that the track selection methodology
of many airlines operating an the North Atlantic may not be optimum and 	 i
that the interpolation process (or lack of it) in developing proper wind
and temperature fields is an important source of error.
Additional data show that the most fuel efficient routes between South
America and Europe do not include the fixed ATC track.
An in-depth analysis of differences between the forecast and verifying
analysis during the 33 day test period was conducted. Fifteen of the 33
days showed significant errors in the operational forecast. 	 On these
days forecast wind speeds in the area of maximum winds were in error by
at least 20 to 25 kts. and sometimes by more than 50 kts. All of these
days were in the summer or fall and one might expect errors of larger
magnitude during the winter.
2.2 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
This study consisted of four data analysis tasks.
ir.
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u Task I compared fuel burn, flight time, air miles and ground miles
on flight plans that were based on the U.S. National Weather Service
(NWS) forecasts with corresponding plans based on the NWS verifying
analyses valid at the time of the forecasts to determine the fuel
savings that were possible through improved weather forecasts. The
comparisons involved flight plans that were produced on the RED and
BLUE Airlines Flight planning systems.
• Task II consisted of similar comparisons to those in Task I but was
based on flight plans and flight tracking data that were produced by
a different system developed at SRI International for the Federal
Aviation Administration. The flight tracking data simulated actual
flight operations and accounted for flight plan deviations such as
those required by air traffic constraints.
• Task III compared segment winds and temperatures from flight plans
based on NWS forecasts to the actual winds and temperatures observed
by aircraft that operated those flights.
• Task IV used flight plan segment wind and temperature differences
from Task I as indicators of forecast errors which were then
analyzed further to determine their probable cause, extent and
significance.
Even though the data sources and methodology differed in each Task,
all four tasks resulted in conclusions that clearly suggested there
is potential for further fuel savings through more accurate weather
forecasts and flight plans.
2.3 KEY FINDINGS
Some key findings from the various tasks are summarized below:
•	 Task I comparisons between 8747 flight plans on operational routes
(which were probably not minimum fuel tracks) based on the NWS
forecast and plans on the same routes based on the verifying
analysis showed that fuel savings per flight on eastbound North
Atlantic routes would average 462 kg (151 gal.) if the forecasts
and verifying analyses were identical, or in other words, if
the forecasts were perfectly accurate. Savings for westbound
.
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flights were negligible. Differences in fuel burn between the plans
on the forecast and the plans on the verifying analysis were always
positive eastbound and negative westbound, suggesting that wind
speeds are always underestimated in the Forecast.
• Further Task I analyses showed that if operational constraints on
the use of minimum time tracks and optimure flight levels were not
imposed by the ATC system the potential savings per flight increases
to 1048 kg (345 gal.) or 1879 kg (618 gal.) depending on the
direction of flight.
• Based on analyses of tracks selected in 144 cases it was determined
that airlines whose track selection methodology is based on minimum
time rather than minimum fuel, and airlines that select a prelimi-
nary minimum time track at a constant flight level before optimizing
the flight level, do not select the optimum fuel NAT track 45 to 50
percent of the time.
• Comparisons of track selections between Amsterdam and Caracas
on a single fixed route that had been used by one airline and on
eight other routes laid out by NASA showed that the original route
was optimum only six times out of 60 cases. The average fuel burn
penalty for being on this route was 1,054 kg (347 gal.) per flight.
• Tusk II comparisons of flight plans based on the NWS forecast with
corresponding plans based on the verifying analysis but using the
SRI model, resulted in the comparable finding that fuel savings of
364 kg (122 gal.) were possible for eastbound B747s on existing
operational North Atlantic, routes if the forecasts were equal to the
verifying analysis.
Task II comparisons involving flight tracking data found that actual
fuel burn and flight times were always higher than planned, in
either direction, and even when the same weather data set was used.
This suggests that either there is an error in the flight tracking
algorithm or that a penalty is incurred due to traffic congestion
and resolution of ATC system conflicts in addition to the penalty
incurred from inaccurate weather forecasts. Since the flight
tracking model output resulted in more diversions than is known to
be the case, it was concluded that there is an error in the flight
tracking algorithm.
Based on analysis of 2,430 flight segments when the flight plan
winds and temperatures based upon the NWS forecast were compared in
Task III to actual data observed by the aircraft, the average
difference between the forecast and observed wind speed was 9 kts.,
the direction difference averaged 26 degrees and the average
temperature difference was 3°C. The average difference in the
component of the forecast wind parallel to the direction of the
SPEAS
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observed wind was 13 kts. In the worst case (when the wind is
always from the direction with maximum impact on the direction of
flight) this 13 kt. error results in fuel burn and time penalties of
up to 15 minutes and 2,835 kg (932 gal.) of fuel for the average
8747 flight. These flight segments were from operational routes
which were not minimum fuel tracks and may not have been in the area
of maximum wind and thus actual errors may be larger.
• Although BLUE and RED Airlines data agreed that the absolute value
of the average temperature errors was 3°C, BLUE found the temper-
atures warmer than forecast while RED found them colder than
forecast. Similarly, BLUE found the wind direction forecast error
toward decreasing azimuthal directions while RED found errors toward
increasing azimuth eastbound and decreasing westbound, indicating
that weather data interpolation errors probably exist in one or both
flight planning systems.
•
	
	 The Task IV analysis showed that significant forecast errors existed
on 15 of the 33 days included in the study. In particular:
- Wind speeds were underestimated by at least 20 to 25 kts. and
sometimes up to 50 kts. in the area of maximum wind on 14 days.
Speeds were underestimated on most other days, as well, but to
a lesser extent.
- There is a tendency to repeat the same forecast errors from
prog to prog even though the intervening analysis showed
clearly that the errors had occurred.
- The Task IV analysis also showed that some perceived forecast
errors may be the result of inadequacies in the weather data
interpolation techniques used in the airline computer flight
planning systems.
In Tasks I and III findings were presented separately for data based on
the BLUE and RED flight planning systems which had different sample
sizes. The figures given above represent weighted averages of the
results from both data sources.
SPEAS
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3. BACKGROUND
******************
The work conducted in this study was in support of the NASA Commercial
Aircraft Fuel Savings Program which was developed to investigate the
potential fuel savings which could be provided by an improved meteoro-
logical data base. Other portions of the program have investigated the
impact of various factors, such as data collection procedures, on the
quality and timing of the meteorological forecasts.
The Commercial Aircraft Fuel Savings Program was conceived by RASA in
1978 partly to take advantage of numerous additional data that were then
being collected as a result of a major international global experiment
that was being conducted at that time. Prior to that ti.ae, sufficient
data were never available on a global scale to study systematically the
potential improvement that could result were significant quantities of
additional data added to the analysis and forecast process.
During this global experiment in 1979 a number of OC10 and 8747 aircraft
were equipped with Aircraft Integrated Data Systems (AIDS). AIDS is an
onboard data processing and storage system which is used by airlines to
monitor aircraft and engine performance data. For this experiment AIDS
was used to collect data on position, altitude, temperature, wind
velocity and time.	 The data were stored on magnetic tape for ground
processing.
PrO SPEAS
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Since U.S. and foreign carriers cooperated in the experiment, AIDS
flights operated throughout the world, altriough the largest concentration
of additional data were collected in the North Atlantic area.
On certain days during 1979 NASA collected AIDS data and corresponding
airline flight plans for the subsequent analyses conducted in this
project.	 AIDS data were provided to the U.S. National Weather Service
which reran its nume r ical analysis model for those days to provide a new
analysis output which had been enhanced by the additional AIDS data.
NASA also retained on magnetic tape (and in hard copy) copies of the
original operational forecasts issued on those days to airlines for
flight planning.
The plan was to use the airline flight plans as a sensitive indicator of
the differences between various meteorological data sets, measuring fuel
burn and flight time or winds and temperatures. Comparisons could be
made, for example, between the original operational forecast and the AIDS
enhanced analysis valid at the time of the forecast or between flight
plans based on the forecast and the raw AIDS data. It was expected that 	 1
the study would show that enhancing the analysis with the AIDS data would
result in improved forecasts and, in turn, more accurate flight plans and
fuel savings.
Much of the data used in this study were developed later by NASA through
the cooperation of the RED and BLGE Airlines. NASA provided these
PrO SPfAS
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airlines with magnetic tape copies of the original NWS operational
ii
forecasts and analyses reruns, in effect, simulating a real time trans-	 1
mission of the current Aviation Digital Data. 	 The airlines were also
r,
supplied with flight plan inputs, prepared by NASA, and designed to
control variables such as routings and aircraft weights so as to elimi-
nate unwanted effects of these variables that are not solely the result
i
of the weather data.
The flight plans calculated on these data by the RED and BLUE Airlines,
using raw AIDS data for positional and altitude information, the original
operational flight plans used on those days in 1979 for the AIDS flights,
and flight plans produced by the SRI International flight planning and
flight tracking simulation model were all retained on magnetic tape and
provided as input to the analyses conducted in this project.
e
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4. DISCUSSION OF TASK I RESULTS
.I
Task I involved various comparisons of groups of flight plans that were
d
based on the operational NWS forecast (the Nine Level Primitive Equation
Model) and plans that were based on the NWS verifying analysis (the
	
l
Flattery Analysis Model) valid at the time of the forecast. 	 All of
the flight plans used in the comparisons were produced by the RED or BLUE
Airlines flight planning systems based upon inputs prepared by NASA.
These inputs exercised option
flight level, cruise speed
variables could be isolated
flight plan groups could be
weather data. Ten to 20 of
al control over such parameters as routing,
and payload so that the affect of these
or eliminated and differences between the
attributed properly to differences in the
the routes were selected to correspond to
actual flights that were operated on that day by aircraft equipped with
an Aircraft Integrated Data System (AIDS). (AIDS provided for collection
and storage of actual weather observation data on magnetic tape for
subsequent processing.) The remaining flight plans were computer
generated and did not necessarily represent any flights actually flown.
Weather and flight plan data sets from 31 days in August through November
and two from January, were used in the Task I analysis. 	 In order to
randomize the data set selection, data from all Mondays and Fridays
during this period were used.
SPEA3
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Four categories of flight plan types were considered in Task I. These
were:
(1) Flight plans based on operational forecasts on routes that were
flown by AIDS equipped aircraft;
(2) Flight plans based on operational forecasts on minimum time/minimum
fuel routes;
(3) Flight plans based on tPe verifying analysis valid at the times of
the forecasts in (1) and (2) and on the same routes used in (1);
(4) Flight plans based on the verifying analysis valid at the times of
the forecasts in (1) and (2) but on the minimum time/minimum fuel
track determined from the verifying analysis.
Differences in fuel burn, flight time, air miles, ground miles and the
ratio of air miles to ground miles for 8747 aircraft were determined for
the following five comparisons between the above groups:
Case 1 - Group 1 minus Group 3
Case 2 - Group 2 minus Group 4
Case 3 - Group 1 minus Group 2
Case 4 - Group 3 minus Group 4
Case 5 - Group 1 minus Group 4
In addition to the above comparisons, an analysis was conducted of track
selections by the RED and BLUE Airlines flight planning systems from the
available North Atlantic Organized Tracks between New York and Amsterdam..
SP=AS
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An analysis of track selections from a group of fixed tracks between
Amsterdam and Caracas was also conducted.
t
The principal findings for each case are summarized in the following
subsections.	 The detailed findings are presented in Volume I of the
final report by direction of flight, region of the world, and data source
(RED or BLUE flight planning system), and include the standard deviation,
variance, 90 percent confidence limits and mean valt!e for each group of
comparisons. Since the sample sizes vary widely the findings for some
regions are less significant statistically and may be misleading.
Therefore, only the fuel burn results for the North Atlantic and for the
total will be presented here. In some of the comparisons all, or nearly
all, of the plans are for North Atlantic flights.
4.1 CASE 1
The first case compared recreated AIDS flights on the forecast weather
to recreated AIDS flights on the verifying analysis. Since all other
flight plan parameters. (route, flight level, etc.) were held constant,
differences between the flight plans reflected differences between the
weather data sets and, in this case, the potential fuel savings that
would result if the forecast and analysis were equal, or in other words,
if the forecast were perfectly accurate.
SPEAS
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The number of flight plan comparisons in the sample and the average
differences (forecast plan value minus actual plan value) in fuel burn
were:
Sample Burn
BLUE System Flight Plans Size Difference
All eastbound flights 222 369 kg
North Atlantic eastbound flights 109 569 kg
All westbound flights 305 -140 kg
North Atlantic westbound flights 143 -295 kg
Sample Burn
RED System Flight Plans Size Difference
All eastbound flights 95 384 kg
All	 westbound flights 147 -371 kg
The positive differences eastbound, and negative differences westbound
indicated that wind spends are generally underestimated in the NWS
forecast model.
4.2 CASE 2
Case 2 compared minimum time tracks on the forecast to minimum time
tracks on the verifying analysis and, as such, was quite similar to Case
1 except for the use of different routes. The objective was to determine
the potential fuel savings that would result if the forecast were perfect
and if carriers could use random tracks.
(arc SPEAS
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The number of flight plan comparisons in the sample and the average
differences in fuel burn in this case were:
Sample Burn
BLUE System Flight Plans- Size Difference
All eastbound 229 739 kg
North Atlantic eastbound 199 815 kg
All westbound 231 -409 kg
North Atlantic westbound 202 -322 kg
Sample Burn
RED System Flight Plans Size Difference
All	 eastbound 29 475 kg
All westbound 29 -324 kg
4.3 CASE 3
Case 3 compared flight plans on routes actually flown by AIDS flights on
the forecast weather to the corresponding minimum time track on the
forecast weather. The objective was to show the potential fuel savings
that could result if carriers were free to fly the minimum time track.
Based on the raw data the sample sizes and the average differences or
savings in fuel burn were:
Sample	 Burn
BLUE System Flight Plans	 Size	 Difference
Eastbound North Atlantic	 36	 511 kg
Westbound North Atlantic	 49	 1978 kg
i
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RED System Flight Plans
Eastbound North Atlantic
Westbound North Atlantic
Sample Burn
Size Difference
7 18;2 kg
10 1}00 kg
15.
Since this case compared recreated AIDS flights to minimum time tracks,
the BLUE data were distorted due to the use of direct routings from
origin to oceanic entry point and due to flight level differences (See
Section 8.2 for further discussion). Estimates of the effect of these
routing and flight level differences were computed and the estimated BLUE
differences after these adjustments were applied were:
Burn
Difference
Eastbound	 1061 kg
Westbound	 1397 kg
4.4 CASE 4
Case 4 was identical to Case 3 except that both the AIDS flights and
minimum time tracks were based on the verifying analysis.
Fuel burn differences using the raw data were:
Sample	 Burn
BLUE System Flight Plans 	 Size	 Difference
Eastbound North Atlantic
	
35	 666 kg
Westbound North Atlantic 	 48	 2096 kg
(pro SPEAS
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Sample	 Burn
RED System Flight Plans 	 Size	 Difference
Eastbound North Atlantic	 7	 1931 kg
Westbound North Atlantic 	 10	 1937 kg
i
i
I
After applying an adjustment for the routing and flight level differ- 	 {
ences, the BLUE savings were:
i
Burn
Difference
Eastbound	 1216 kg
Westbound	 1515 kg
I
4.5 CASE 5
Case 5 combined the conditions of Cases 3 and 4 and compared AIDS flights
on the forecast weather to minimum time track flights on the verifying
analysis. The objective was to show the combined savings from improved
forecasts and from el'minating ATC restrictions on the use of the
minimum time track.
Again, based on the raw data alone, the potential savings were: 	 j
	Sample
	
Burn
BLUE System Flight Plans 	 Size	 Difference
Eastbound North Atlantic 	 36	 1311 kg
Westbound North Atlantic 	 49	 1594 kg
^' rf
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Sample	 Burn
RED System Flight Plans
	
Size	 Difference
Eastbound North Atlantic	 6	 1989 kg
Westbound North Atlantic	 10	 1220 kg
Applying the adjustment to the BLUE data results in savings of:
Burn
Difference
Eastbound	 1861 kg
Westbound	 1013 kg
4.6 NORTH ATLANTIC TRACK SELECTION
Analysis of flight plans run on each of the North Atlantic Organized
Tracks at each available flight level on each of 30 days in both direc-
tions tested three hypotheses, each of which is followed by some airlines
and is incorporated in their track selection algorithms.
1) On 40 out of 84 "days" (30 eastbound and 30 westbound for BLUE, and
16 eastbound and 8 westbound for RED) the minimum time track was not
coincident with the minimum fuel track. Thus, airlines whose track
selection is based on time rather than fuel are on the wrong track
45 percent of the time.
2) In 28 out of 60 cases the minimum time track selected at FL330 or
FL350 was not the minimum fuel track at optimum altitude. This
indicates that airlines that select a preliminary minimum time track
at a constant flight level and then optimize for fuel in the flight
plan are on the wrong track 47 percent of the time and incur an
average fuel burn penalty of 248 kg each time they are on the wrong
track. (This is based on comparisons of flight plans using the NWS
models ope^ational in 1979. Data from other tasks in this study
indicate that the penalty would be larger if actual data were
compared.)
17.
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3) In 19 out of 60 cases the minimum fuel track on the verifying
arilysis was not the same track as the minimum fuel track on the
forecast. This is contrary to the beliefs of many carriers who feel
that the weather changes so slowly that the best track does not
change between the forecast and the verifying analysis even though
the time and fuel burn on that track might change.
4.7 AMSTEROP4M-CARACAS TRACKS
One airline, and possibly more, had been using a single fixed route
between Europe and the Caribbean. NASA laid out eight additional routes
and ran flight plans on each one, in each direction for 30 days.
The original fixed route proved to be the best one only six times out of
the 60 cases. The average fuel burn penalty for being on this route was
1054 kg per flight.
fJrc SPEAS
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5. DISCUSSION OF TASK II RESULTS
k
In Task II comparisons were conducted between various categories of
flight plans and flight tracking data that were produced by a simulation
system developed ' at SRI International for the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration.	 Based upon a given set of weather data the system produced
flight plans and flight tracking data. Flight tracking data simulate the
actual flight tracks of all aircraft operating on a given weather data
set and provide such features as the rerouting of some flights as
necessary to resolee ATC conflicts. The weather data used were the same
NWS forecasts and verifying analyses used in Task I but covered fewer
days.
Four categories of data were analyzed. These were:
(1) Flight plans based on an operational forecast;
(2) Flight tracking based on the flight plans in (1) but using the
weather from the verifying analysis valid at the time of the
forecast;
(3) Flight plans based on the actual weather valid at the time of the
forecast used in (1);
(4) Flight tracking based on the flight plans in ( 3) and using the
actual weather from the verifying analysis.
^S,,.' SPEAS
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As in Task I comparisons were made of differences in fuel burn, flight
time, air miles, ground miles and the ratio of air miles to ground miles
between the following flight plan and flight tracking categories:
Case 1 - Group 1 and Group 2
Case 2 - Group 1 and Group 3
Case 3 - Group 2 and Group 4
Case 4 - Group 3 and Group 4
Case 5 - Groups 1	 and 3	 with	 the	 actual	 airline	 flight	 plans	 from
Task I
Comparisons were made for entire flights and for flight segments and were
presented by direction of flight, region and by aircraft type groups such
as 8747s, DC10/L1011s, or 8707/DC8s. The detailed findings are presented
in Volume Ib of the final report.
The results of the comparisons for 8747 aircraft for each of the five
cases are summarized in the following subsections. 	 Findings for other
aircraft type groups were comparable but only the 8747 data are presented
here for consistency in comparisons to the Task I findings which were
exclusively for B747s.
5.1 CASE 1
The first set of comparison data were developed by subtracting the
flight tracking values on the verifying analysis from the flight plan
rrO SPEAS
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values developed on the forecast weather. The conditions in this case
were similar to those in Case 1 of Task I in that the comparison measured
potential fuel savings that could result if the weather forecast were
equal to the verifying analysis. Only the model, or source of the
	
NI
flight plans, was different and the actual effect of ATC diversions was 	 j
included.
Tne numbers of 8747 flight plan comparisons in the sample and the average
differences in fuel burn were:
Sample Burn
Size Difference
Eastbound North Atlantic 167 -775 kg
Eastbound Polar 36 -810 kg
Westbound North Atlantic 235 -1278 kg
Westbound Polar 39 -451 kg
The negative values eastbound are contrary to the Task I findings and
would imply that wind speeds are always overforecast, or that the flight
tracking fuel burn is always higher because of ATC diversions.
For westbound flights these findings are consistent with the Task I
results but they are contrary to the eastbound results and imply that
aircraft always burn more than flight plan regardless of whether they are
flying against or with a wind forecast error. One must conclude that
.j
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the differences are not eotirely weather related and must be greatly
influenced by the conflict resolution algorithm of the flight tracking
model.
5.2 CASE 2 FINDINGS
In the second case flight plans on the forecast weather were compared
to flight plans on the verifying analysis.
	 Except for the use of a
different flight planning model as the data source and except for the
fact that new NAT tracks were selected on the verifying analysis, and
thus routings could be different, this analysis was also similar to Case
1 of Task I.
The numoers of 8747 flights compared and the average fuel burn differ-
ences for Case 2 were:
Sample Burn
Size Difference
Eastbound North Atlantic 159 374 kg
Eastbound Polar 33 318 kg
Westbound North Atlantic 154 -237 kg
Westbouna Polar 24 -420 kg
The positive differences eastbound and negative differences westbound
were consistent with and confirmed the Task conclusion that wind
speeds were normally underestimated, and indicate that negative data
SPEAS
sets in Task II Case 1 were probably the result of the flight tracking
algorithm.
5.3 CASE 3 FINDINGS
Case 3 comparisons were developed by subtracting the times, burns and
other parameters on the flight tracking data from Group 4, based on the
verifying analysis, from the corresponding Group 2 flight tracking data
which were also based on the verifying analysis but used flight plan
inputs based on the forecast.
Since the same weather data were used in each case this comparison was a
measure of the potential fuel savings (or penalty) that could result from
improvements in the flight plan or track inputs to the flight tracking
simulator.
The findings for B747 comparisons in Case 3 were:
Sample Burn
Size Difference
Eastbound North Atlantic 159 273 kg
Eastbound Polar 33 96 kg
Westbound North Atlantic 154 243 kg
Westbound Polar 24 -79 kg
IN
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Positive values, both eastbound and westbound, suggest that either fuel
burn penalty from the ATC system is less when an improved forecast is
used in flight planning or that errors were introduced by the flight
tracking algorithm.
5.4 CASE 4 FINDIN&S
Case 4 compared data from flight plans based on the verifying analysis
to flight tracking data developed from the same verifying analysis.
Since the same weather was used, differences found between these two
groups of plans were unrelated to weather but represented a measurement
of the potential effect of improved NAT track selection and the conflict
resolution simulations of the flight tracking model.
The findings for the 8747 comparisons in Case 4 were:
Sample Burn
Size Difference
Eastbound North Atlantic 160 -927 kg
Eastbound Polar 33 -1034 kg
Westbound North Atlantic 154 -599 kg
Westbound Polar 24 -76 kg
The negative differences in both directions suggest that actual flight
times, fuel burns and air miles are always greater than planned even when
the plans were based on the verifying analysis, and thrt these penalties
V
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are the result of conflict resolution and traffic congestion in the ATC
I
system or in the flight tracking algorithm.
5.5 CASE 5 FINDINGS
The objective of the final comparison in Task II was to determine the
flight parameter differences between the flight plans developed by the
SRI model for this task and the corresponding actual airline flight
plans from Task III. 	 Holoever, since takeoff weights, flight levels and
routings were quite different, average burn differences of more than
10,000 kg per flight were found. 	 Since these variables could not be
controlled, it would be difficult to attribute the differences to any
particular cause and these data were judged to be of relatively little
value.
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6. DISCUSSION OF TASK III RESULTS
The Task III analysis compared actual wind and temperature observations
taken by AIDS equipped aircraft during eight months of 1979 with data
from the Flight plans used by those flights. The flight plans were based
upon the NWS forecasts valid near the time the flights operated and were
computed on the RED or BLUE Airlines flight planning systems. Flight
plans for flights of the other airlines that use the BLUE Airlines system
were also included in this analysis.
The objective of the Task III analysis was to determine differences that
existed between the forecast winds and temperatures and those actually
observed by the aircraft.	 In Task 1, differences were determined
(measured by fuel burn, flight time and air miles) between the forecast
and the actual as represented by the NWS forecast and analysis models,
after the data were subjected to the editing, smoothing, and other
adjustments inherent in the model.
Computer programs were developed to extract the wind and temperature data
from the flight plans and AIDS tapes, reduce them to comparable flight
segments, and produce statistics on the differences between the forecast
and actual winds and temperatures.	 While the flight plan winds and
•	 temperatures were normally already available as averages of ten degree
26.
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longitude segments, the AIDS observations were typically spaced at 200 km
intervals and averages for 10 degree segments had to be developed.
A cubic spline function' was used to represent the AIDS flight's wind
direction, speed, temperature and latitude as a continuous function of
longitude along the flight path. The discrete values of these parameters
were then determined for each five degree meridional crossing - i.e.,
5OW, 45W, 40W, 35W, etc.	 Average values for the ten degree segment
were then determined weighting the midpoint twice the weight of each
endpoint.
Segment data were checked for matches of month, day, flight number,
origin, destination and flight level. Segments for which the AIDS
flight did not match the operational flight plan were discarded.
6.1 MAGNITUDE OF FORECAST DIFFERENCES
Matching data from AIDS flights and flight plans were found for 2,430
segments distributed regionally as follows:
BLUE RED
Airlines Airlines
394 358
696 736
4 79
13 109
9
32
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Differences between the flight plans and AIDS data per flight segment,
and thus between the forecast and the observed, are summarized below:
BLUE	 RED
Airlines	 Airlines
Average Algebraic Difference
Wind Direction	 -5 deg	 +1 deg
Wind Speed	 -9 kts	 -5 kts
Temperature	 V2°C	 +1°c
Average of Absolute Values of Differences
Wind Direction	 29 deg	 20 deg
Wind Speed	 14 kts	 13 kts
Temperature	 3°C	 3°C
Average Difference in Component of 	 16 kts	 8 kts
Forecast Wind Parallel to Observed Wind
RMS Vector Error	 33 kts	 24 kts
Using data from Task I on average North Atlantic flight times and fuel
burns, it was determined that in the worst case (when the wind is always
from the direction with maximum impact on the direction of flight) this
error results in fuel burn and time penalties of up to 15 minutes and
2,835 kg of fuel for a 8747 flight. This fuel burn penalty, or potential
savings if the forecast were perfect, amounts to 3.6 percent of the fuel
burn for the flight.
Since the criteria for matching AIDS flights and flight plans resulted
in some 70 to 80 percent of segments being rejected, a supplemental
analysis was conducted with relaxed criteria to expand the size of the
SPEAS
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sample.
	
In this second run segments with flight level differences of
plus or minus 2,000 feet between the flight plan and AIDS data were not
rejected. This resulted in a sample of 1,788 BLUE Airlines segments and
1,282 RED Airlines segments for a total of 3,070 segments. Even though
the sample increased by 72 percent the average forecast error only
changed by 1.08 degrees on wind direction, 0.1 kts on speed, and 0.34°C
on temperature, leading to the conclusion that the original sample was
large enough to be representative of the real world even though many data
had to be rejected.
6.2 SIGN OF FORECAST DIFFERENCES
Since the average algebraic differences between the forecast values and
the observed values were determined by subtracting the observed value
from the forecast value, the algebraic sign of the differences provided
further data on the forecast errors.
For the North Atlantic region the means of the algebraic differences
between the operational flight plan and the AIDS data were:
Temperature Wind Speed
(°C) Direction (deg) (kts)
BLUE Airline
Eastbound -2.28 -5.35 -8.27
Westbound -2.53 -4.17 -8.97
RED Airline
Eastbound +1.97 +1.94 -6.39
Westbound +1.69 -2.04 -4.24
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For both airlines the average wind speed differences were always nega-
tive, meaning the AIDS winds were stronger and implying that wind speeds
were underestimated which confirms the findings of the other tasks in
this study.
Negative temperature differences mean temperatures were warmer than
forecast and the findings on temperature were somewhat incongruous.
Even though both airlines' data agreed that the temperature forecasts
were in error by approximately 3°C, the BLUE Airlines data showed the
temperatures warmer than forecast while the RED data implied temperatures
were colder than forecast (positive differences). 	 Regarding wind
direction, negative differences mean the forecast wind is from a lower
azimuthal direction than the ac,val wind, or in other words, considering
that the average wind direction should be from 270 degrees, negative
differences suggest actual winds more northwesterly than forecast
and positive differences suggest actual winds more southwesterly than
forecast. On wind direction, the BLUE Airlines differences were always
negative while the RED Airlines differences (for the larger North
Atlantic sample) were positive eastbound and negative westbound.	 No
information available to PRC Speas suggests an explanation for these
latter two incongruous findings and it is suspected that they are the
result of features peculiar to the weather data interpolation techniques
in use by the RED or BLUE Airlines or both.
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7. DISCUSSION OF TASK IV RESULTS
7.1 OBJECTIVE AND ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
In the Task IV analysis, differences between flight plan winds and
temperatures based on the forecast and on the verifying analysis from
Task I were used as indicators of dates and geographic areas for which
significant forecast errors may have occurred. The objective of Task IV
was to review available forecasts and verifying analyses valid at the
forecast time so as to explain forecast errors which occurred and to
discuss their significance.
Flight plan segments with wind direction differences greater than
30 degrees, speed differences greater than 20 kts., or temperature
differences greater than 5°C, between the plan on the forecast and the
plan on the analysis, were designated as segments with forecast errors.
More stringent criteria were tried at first but it resulted in some
10,000 forecast error segments which were considered to be too numerous
to be analyzed with meaningful results.
Many of these "error segments" were widely scattered or isolated geo-
graphically and of little significance. Others were clustered and
consistent with other adjacent error segments. Since the objective of
Task IV was to comment on significant forecast errors, the isolated error
31.
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segments were ignored, while those that appeared in patterns of synoptic
scale or large areal extent were identified for further analysis.
i
7.2 IDENTIFICATION OF FORECAST ERRORS
•	 V
For those dates and geographic regions so identified, other data pro-
vided by NASA were reviewed.	 These normally consisted of the National
Meteorological Center (NMC) 250 mb. forecasts and analyses valid at OOOOZ
on the day under review and OOOOZ on the following day. 250 mb. level
analyses prepared by Delta Airlines were also used for some days.
The RED and BLUE Airlines data from Task I initially identified forecast
errors on 31 of the 33 days included in the study. In Volume IV of the
final report a summary is presented for each day which gives the number
of RED and BLUE Airlines flights, the number of error segments, the areas
in which forecast errors occurred and a discussion of the extent and
significance of the errors.
Further review of the data revealed an inconsistency in the RED and BLUE
Airlines data from Task I.
A substantially higher number of error segments were found by RED
Airlines even though it operated fewer flights.	 For the BLUE Airline
there were 853 flights and 908 error segments for an average of 1.06 per
flight. For the RED Airline 262 flights encountered 858 error segments
for an average of 3.2 per flight. If the Mid East segments are excluded
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the BLUE Airlines error segments are reduced to 528 for 651 flights, or
an average of 0.8 per flight.
Since both airlines used the same weather data, it is obvious that there
are differences in their interpolation algorithms since only one detected
apparent "forecast errors" when both operated flights through the same
area.
Further investigation showed that the RED Airlines winds were often
completely incompatible with either the forecast or the verifying
analysis. Wind direction errors of up to 180 degrees occurred on days,
and in geographic areas, on which the BLUE Airlines data showed few or
zero errors.
It was decided that some error in the data interpolation or flight
planning algorithm in the RED system was causing an apparently erroneous
identification of error segments.
When the BLUE data alone were considered, 10 of the 33 days were found to
have forecast errors of significant magnitude and areal extent. 	 For
three additional days, the BLUE Airlines error segments indicated
relatively minor forecast errors but, upon visual inspection of the
forecast and analysis charts, it was determined that significant errors
existed but were not detected by the BLUE Airline flights which were not
routed near the forecast error area.
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Even though most of the forecast errors indicated by the RED flight plans
were discarded because they were not consistent with the other data, on
two days the errors indicated by RED Airlines were confirmed by visull
inspection of the charts and were judged to be significant.
I
Thus, between the RED and BLUE data, 15 of the 33 days were found to have
significant forecast errors.
7.3 FINDINGS
7.3.1 Forecast Errors
Data for the 15 days identified two types of repetitive and significant
errors.	 These were underestimated wind speeds, and repetition of
forecast errors.
	 i
Underestimated Wind Speeds
A persistent error found throughout the analysis was the underestimation
of wind speeds.	 In 14 of the forecast error situation the forecast
maximum winds were at least 20 to 25 kts. and sometimes more than 50 kts.
lighter than actual.	 Wind speeds further away from the core were
proportionately in error out to the 70 kt, or 50 kt, level where the
errors become insignificant. Since the actual value of the maximum wind
speed and the lateral extent of the "significant" or stronger winds
varied from day to day it is not possible in summary to quantify this
finding further.
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Wind speed forecast errors were also found on five additional days but
these were judged to be less significant errors because of their lesser
magnitude and extent,
k
Repetition of Forecast Erro rs
In the analysis it was noted that apparent forecast errors were not
corrected on subsequent forecasts. Review of the forecasts issued 12 or
24 hours later showed that errors such as the wind speed errors noted
above were carried from prog to prog even though the intervening analysis
showed many actual observation; of data that were in disagreement kith
the forecast. A forecast, for example, that showed a maximum wind
isotach of 90 kts. would be followed by another with a 90 kt. maximum
isotach value even though winds of 125 to 135 kts. were observed at
the valid time of the prog.	 Sometimes, the same situation would.have
occurred 24 hours earlier and 24 hours later, as well, with the forecasts
giving no indication of the existence of the stronger winds.
This repetition of the forecast errors was confirmed on five days of the
i
33 reviewed. There were indications that forecast errors were repeated
on many of the other days but it was not possible to confirm this since
data were only retained for the days involved in the study, and thus,
data for the adjacent forecast periods were not always available.
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Location of Synoptic Features
Even though there were frequent errors in wind speed forecasts, as noted
above, the forecasts of the location, movement, development and intensity
of synoptic scale features were usually quite accurate. -On five days
the forecasts were ,judged to have significant errors of this nature.
Typically, these consisted of such errors as underestimating the extent
of deepening of a trough which resulted in an extensive area of wind
direction errors. On' three additional days, less significant errors of
this type were noted.
7.3.2 Other Errors
Analysis of the error segments and visual inspection of the corresponding
forecast and analysis charts found several other errors which may have
been perceived as forecast errors but are likely the result of some
procedure or feature of the airline flight planning systems. These are
discussed below.
Time Interpolation and Choice of Prog
It was apparent from the analysis that time interpolation between
weather prcgs, or the choice of prog on which the flight plan is based,
caused some of the wind differences between the forecast and analysis,
especially in rapidly changing si t uations.	 On several days, review of
the OOOOZ forecast and analysis, and review of the forecast and analysis
valid 24 hours later showed that the forecasts were highly accurate,
but flight plans based on an intervening forecast, such as the 180OZ,
jrl'C SPEAS
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resulted in error segments. It is possible that in these few cases there
were no forecast errors at all but rather that the flight planning
algorithm or the analysis methodology somehow resulted in forecast winds
being compared to actual winds valid at a different time.
Average Winds in Areas of Sharp Gradient
The methodology by which these airlines develop the average winds for a
flight plan segment may have resulted in some "forecast errors". Both
airlines use some scher, to determine an average wind for a flight plan
segment from adjacent Marsden Square data. Since some flight plan
segments can traverse more than one Marsden Square, in areas of sharp
gradient flight plan winds may be developed by averaging very light winds
with very strong winds, de pending on the algorithm being used. 	 This
averaging process appears to have resulted in some apparent forecast
errors on the flight plans, which do not appear when one visually
compares the forecast and analysis charts.
This problem applies equally to situations with a pronounced wind
direction gradient. 	 Many forecast error segments were found near the
centers of highs, lows, ridges or troughs where the wind direction
changes rapidly with dis`ance.
Mid-East Errors
Significant "forecast errors" were noted on 11 days in the Mid East area
by BLUE Airlines.	 Even on other days there were usually some error
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segments but they were judged to be relatively insignificant and not
worth further analysis. Often these "errors" were on the same routes day
after day - routes through Yugoslavia, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
The charts that were available did not extend far enough east to be of
help in explaining the forecast errors in this area. 	 However, it is
believed that the persisten', almost daily, occurrence of forecast errors
in this area is significant on its own even if the significance of the
individual daily errors cannot be determined. 	 Since it is difficult to
explain how a forecast error should occur in the same location so often,
it was assumed that this was the result of some anomaly in the BLUE
Airlines system.
Pr'C SPEAS
39.
I
i^
8. METHODOLOGY AND DATA REDUCTION
.j
******************k***k*************** 	 'A
8.1 METHODOLOGY	
^I
Numerous flight plan data were provided by NASA on magnetic tape for • the
analyses conducted during this study.
	 In Task I alone, for example, up 	
I
to 20,000 flight plans were included in the data base.
The methodology required that data be extracted from the flight plans and
identified. Appropriate groups of data would then be compared and the
i
results presented.	 Specific procedures peculiar to any one task were
discussed in the previous sections of this report that discussed the
result; of each task. In general, however, the first and most difficult
task was to extract the data from the various flight plan formats
included in the input magnetic tapes.
Flight plans for Task I were presented in the appropriate output format
of either the RED or BLUE Airlines, • while plans for Task III were copied
on magnetic tape from the teletype output queue and included such
extraneous data as message switching codes and line control characters.
These tapes also included flight plans which were not relevant to this
study. The SRI flight plans in Task II and the AIDS data presented two
more formats to decode.
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Computer programs were developed to scan the input tapes and to extract
and identify relevant data.	 Data such as date, origin, destination,
flight time, fuel burn, wind component and temperature were identified
from each flight plan and stored in files for subsequent comparisons
between the various flight plan groups. In some cases the data were not
presented on the flight plans and had to be derived from available data,
such as winds from the wind correction angle and true air speed on the
BLUE Airlines flight plans.
The comparisons between groups of flight plans were then processed by
computer and the statistical results output in graphic form. Figure 8-1
is a sample of the typical output format. In each task and sub-task the
objective was usually to determine differences in some parameter between
plans based on one set of conditions and plans en some other conditions.
As Figure 8-1 shows the mean value of the difference was determined,
along with the variance, standard deviation and 90 percent confidence
limits. An histogram depicted the frequency of occurrence of incremental
values of the differences between the two groups.
8.2 DATA ANOMALIES
Since the data used in these analyses were collected during 1979 and some
preliminary processing was conducted by NASA during 1980, it was not
possible during this project in 1981 to rerun, correct, or recreate any
erroneous or missing data. 	 As a result of procedural anomalies during
data collection or other factors which are no longer known, there was
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Figure 8-1
SAMPLE OUTPUT
*
*
*
*
*
*
k**
* ****************** *
----+----+----+-_--+----+----+----+----+"---+----+----+
-20	 -10	 0	 +10	 +20
Mean	 2.16
Variance	 34.61
Standard Deviation	 5.88
90% Confidence Limits 	 -7.52 to 11.84
Total Occurrences	 384
Total Fuel Consumed -Hundreds
Operational Forecast Vs. Re-Analysis
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some loss of data for some of the tasks and a corresponding reduction in
the
	 size	 of	 the	 statistical	 sample.	 However,	 sufficient	 reliable	 data	 1
were left to form valid conclusions from the analyses.
In Task I,	 several	 features inherent in the BLUE Airlines flight planning
system,	 the NWS	 analysis model,	 and	 NASA's	 input	 procedures caused some
anomalies	 in	 the
	
data base.
	 Three	 of	 these were	 somewhat	 significant.
First,	 an	 error	 checking	 procedure	 in	 the	 NWS	 software	 caused	 pilot
reports	 and	 AIDS	 data	 submitted	 by	 NASA	 to	 be	 ignored,	 and	 resulted
in	 the	 verifying	 analyses	 being	 always	 identical	 to	 the	 forecasts	 in
equatorial	 regions	 and	 the	 Southern	 Hemisphere.	 As	 a result data from
some flights in these regions had to be discarded.
Second,	 AIDS	 recreated	 flights	 in	 the	 BLUE	 system	 used	 direct,	 great
circle routes	 between	 the origin	 and	 the oceanic	 entry point while the
minimum time track plans were restricted to airways.	 This resulted in a
distance bias generally favoring the AIDS flights which sometimes gave a
fictitious	 indication of fuel 	 savings when AIDS flights were compared to
`,	 r
minimum time tracks.
Third,	 since	 NASA's	 inputs	 to	 the	 BLUE	 system	 tried	 as	 closely	 as
T5
possible
	
to	 recreate	 the	 original	 conditions	 under	 which	 AIDS	 flights
operated, flight	 levels were restricted to those used by the AIDS flight
while minimum	 time
	
track	 plans
	 were	 calculated	 at optimum	 levels.	 This
i
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resulted in fuel burn differences which were attributed to the flight
level difference rather than weather data differences.
Adjustments were made manually to the computer output to correct the
findings for these anomalous data. The adjustment factors were deter-
mined from the actual distance differences between the airways and direct
routes used by all of the flights in Task I.and from the actual flight
level differences between the plans.
Another procedural problem during data collection resulted in a substan-
tial reduction in the size of the sample in Task III.
	 In Task III AIDS
observations of winds and temperatures were compared to those on the
flight plan of the flight which observed those data. This required the
airlines to retain copies of the flight plans during the data collection
period. The BLUE Airline accomplished this by periodically dumping the
output queue from its flight planning system on to magnetic tape. During
the Task III analysis it was discovered that this "dump" was apparently
not done frequently enough and substantial numbers of flight plans were
lost. It was estimated as a result that up to 50 percent of the possible
segment comparisons were lost, because the flight plan corresponding to
the AIDS flight could not be found.
However, sufficient data were still available to form valid conclusions
and, in fact, a supplemental run which nearly doubled the sample size
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through relaxed error checking criteria resulted in negligible changes to
the results.
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